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THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE
The juvenile justice system in New York State is in crisis. The system deals with
youth between ages seven and fifteen who commit crimes. Teenagers age sixteen and
over are treated as adults,1 as are some thirteen- and fourteer'-year-olds accused of
certain felonies. 2 In the last few years, news reports, studies, and investigations have
exposed a system that is cruel, costly, and counterproductive. Here are some of the
key events:
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigated four New
York juvenile detention facilities and issued a report in August
2009 finding that juveniles held in confinement were regularly
being abused, severely injured, and deprived of constitutional
rights. 3 The State recently reached a settlement with the DOJ to
forestall further legal action.
4
The Legal Aid Society of New York filed a class action lawsuit
against New York State (G.B. v. Carridn5 ) ovei. intolerable
conditions in juvenile institutions, including several institutions
that were not covered by the DOJ in estigation. 6
A thirty-two member Task Force on Transforming Juvenile
Justice, appointed by Governor David Paterson (the "Governor's
Task Force"), issued a report in December 2009 detailing
widespread problems in the juvenile system and proposing
twenty recommendations for reform. The Governor's Task Force
dealt only with post-adjudication issues and worked through two
subcommittees, one titled "Redefining Residential Care" and
1. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2010).
2. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
3. CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE LANSING RESIDENTIAL CENTER,
LOUIS GosSET, JR. RESIDENTIAL CENTER, TRYON RESIDENTIAL CENTER, AND TRYON GIRLS CENTER,
(2009) [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE INVESTIGATION].
4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces a Comprehensive Agreement
with New York to Remedy Violations and Ensure Constitutional Rights at Four Juvenile Justice
Facilities (July 14, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-crt-S11.html. The DOJ
complaint, filed in federal district court in New York, is available online. Id.
5. No. 09-civ-10582 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (order denying preliminary injunction).
6. See Nicholas Confessore, Treatment of Youths in New York Prisons Spurs Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009,
at A23. The complaint in the case accuses the Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) of using
techniques of physical restraint that "expose children to the risks of difficulty breathing, cardiac and
respiratory arrest, back, arm and neck injuries, abrasions, bruises, strained muscles and other
musculoskeletal injuries, and head injuries." Complaint, at 12, G.B. v. Carri6n, No. 09-10582 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Dec. 30, 2009), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/media/125217i09cvl0582paccompiaint.pdf.
It also states "OCS staff use physical force disproportionately against children with mental illness."
Complaint at 17. G.B., one of the named plaintiff', allegedly had a history of mental disorder'. In five
separate incideiits, OCFS guards threw him to the ground; bent his left arm, which was broken, behind
his back; hit him in the face; banged his head of the floor; and put him in a choke hold for not picking
up a piece of paper he had dropped on the floor. Complaint at 28-29.
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the other "Re-entry and Alternatives to Placement." The Task
Force confirmed that abuse of juvenile inmates by staff was not
limited to the four centers identified in the DOJ report, but a
problem throughoutthe system. The report's recommendations
include a call for greater use of alternatives to incarceration,
provision of basic social and mental health services, better
preparation of youth for re-entry into the community, improved
staff training for rehabilitation of youthful offenders, and
reduction of the disproportionate representation of minority
youth in institutional placements. The report praised the Office
of Children and Family Services (OCFS) for its recent efforts to
reduce the population of its youth prisons and to reduce the use
of unnecessary and excessive force against inmates, but said
there was still much work to be done. 8
A Human Rights Watch and American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) inquiry in 2006 reported the excessive use of force in
the state's juvenile institutions for girls. The report detailed the
overuse of physical restraint, resulting in broken bones, "rug
burns" from being pushed face-first with arms held back into the
floor, and other injuries inflicted by staff members who were
inadequately trained and poorly supervised. Problems of sexual
abuse and harassment were also described.t
Gladys Carrion, commissioner of OCFS-the agency that runs
the state's juvenile institutions-has accepted the criticisms of
her agency and has vigorously pursued reforms in the system.'0
On April 29, 2011, a symposium on Juvenile Justice Reform in New York was
hosted by the Diane Abbey Law Center for Children and Families at New York Law
School." Panelists looked at the various efforts for reform in all aspects of New
York's juvenile justice system: from the first contact with police, through the
adjudication process, to sentencing and detention practices.' 2 Many agreed with the
7. GOVERNOR DAVID PATERSON'S TASK FORCE ON TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, CHARTING A NEW
COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 12-13 (2009)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE], http://www.vera.org/download?file=2944/Charting-a-new-course-A-
blueprint-for-transforming-juvenile-justice-in-New-York- State.pdf.
8. Id. at 17.
9. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CUSTODY AND CONTROL: CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK'S JUVENILE PRISONS FOR GIRLS 3-7 (2006), http://www.aclu.org/files/
pdfs/racialjustice/us todycontrol20060925.pdf.
10. See ina text accompanying notes 131-32.
1]. Symposium, Juvenile Justice Reform in New York, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1263 (2011-12).
1 2. For articles addressing different acpects ofjuvenile justice reform in New York as part of this symposium
see Michael A. Corricro, .judging Children as Children. Reclaiming New York's Progressive Tradition, 56
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assessment of former Chief Judge Judith Kaye that the momentum for reform in
New York is at a high point.' 3 Despite this momentum, changing a longstanding,
complex system with many actors and multiple power centers is no easy task.
Will the reform movement achieve its goals? Part I of this article discusses the
last major changes in the system, spurred by both the 1967 Supreme Court decision
in In re Gault and a deep-seated fear of juvenile crime in the last decades of the
twentieth century.' Part II examines the present crisis and analyzes the elements
favoring reform, including the crucial role of the New York Times, and the obstacles
to reform, including the unpredictability of the state's political leadership, opposing
legislative forces, and uncertainty regarding budget battles over funding for
significant reforms of the juvenile justice system in New York.
I. GAULT AND THE CHANGES THAT FOLLOWED IN NEW YORK
Many years ago, the nation's juvenile justice systems were reformed by order of
the U.S. Supreme Court. A fifteen-year-old boy named Gerald Gault was charged
with making a lewd phone call to a neighbor, Mrs. Cook.1 Under loose procedures
in force in the state of Arizona, the boy was arrested on June 8, 1964, with no notice
to his parents and no formal written charges. His mother discovered from a friend
that her son had been taken into custody. A court hearing was held the very next day.
As later described by the Supreme Court,
[o]n June 9, Gerald, his mother, his older brother, and Probation Officers
Flagg and Henderson appeared before the Juvenile Judge in chambers.
Gerald's father was not there. He was at work out of the city. Mrs. Cook, the
complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at this hearing. No transcript
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1413 (2011-12) (Executive Director and Founder of the New York Center for
Juvenile Justice, formerly served as a judge in the New York State courts for twenty-eight years); Nancy
L. Fishman, Reducing Juvenile Detention: Notes from an Experiment on Staten Island, 56 N.Y.L. Scn. L.
REv. 1475 (2011-12) (Project Director for Youth Justice Programs at the Center for Court Innovation);
Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise ofAggressive Policing and Zero Tolerance Discipline in New
York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1373 (2011-12) (Professor and Advocacy Director at the
New York Civil Liberties Union); Gabrielle Prisco, When the Cure Makes You Ill: Seven Core Principles to
Change the Course qf Youth Justice, 56 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1433 (2011-12) (Director of the Juvenile
Justice Project); and Brett G. Stoudt, Michelle Fine & Madeline Fox, Growing up Policed in the Age of
Aggressive Policing Policies, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1331 (2011-12) (Professor, and Coordinator, Polling
for Health, Education and Justice Project, respectively). The issue also features essays based on remarks
given by the Hon. Judith S. Kaye, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, delivered on
August 27, 2010 at the City Law Breakfast Series,Juvenile Justice Reform: Now Is the Moment, 56 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REv. 1299 (2011-12), and Jeremy Travis, President of John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
delivered on April 29, 2011 at the New York Law School Juvenile Justice Symposium, Reflections on
Juvenile Justice Reform in New York, 56 N.Y.L. Sc. L. Rav. 1317 (2011-12).
13. See Kaye, supra note 12.
14. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
15. Id. at4 5,7.
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or recording was made. No memorandum or record of the substance of the
proceedings was prepared.16
Gerald answered some questions posed by the judge. A week later, the hearing
resumed, still in the absence of a complaining witness, and the judge found Gerald
to be a delinquent and ordered him sent to a juvenile detention institution for the rest
of his minority, i.e., until he reached age twenty-one. As the boy was fifteen, this
meant a sentence of six years. If someone over eighteen years of age had committed
the same offense, the maximum sentence in the state would have been a fine or two
months imprisonment.1
Not surprisingly, state law allowed juveniles no right to appeal. A habeas corpus
petition ultimately brought the matter before the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas,
after reviewing the slipshod manner in which the proceedings were conducted,
condemned the state's undue haste, lack of notice of the charges against Gerald, lack
of time for the defense to prepare and investigate, lack of sworn testimony, failure to
produce the complaining witness for questioning, failure to recognize a right against
self-incrimination, and lack of legal counsel for Gerald. Writing for the Court,
Fortas was moved to acidly remark, "Under our Constitution, the condition of being
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."1 The Court ruled that the proceedings
unconstitutionally deprived juveniles of the right to notice of the charges, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, to avoid self-incrimination, and to counsel. The fact
that the proceedings were labeled "civil" by the state did not blind the Court to the
serious deprivation of liberty, which activated the traditional constitutional
protections for those accused of crimes.' 9 The long era of casual juvenile court
adjudication was over.
New York had for many years applied criminal court procedures in juvenile cases,
partly because the original children's court was an offshoot of the criminal court. In
a 1927 case, People v. Fitzgerald, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the
arguments of the District Attorney that the rules of evidence and the state criminal
code governing proof of crimes should not apply in juvenile delinquency cases. 20 The
court saw no difference between charging a boy with "delinquency" arising from a
burglary and charging an adult with the "crime" of burglary since both the boy and
the adult were subject to loss of their liberty upon a finding that they committed the
wrongful act. 21
16. Id.at5.
17. -d. at 29.
18. Id. at 28.
19. See 1d. at 17.
20. 244 N.Y. 307 (1927). This was followed up in 1931 by an Appellate Division case holding the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard must be applied in juvenile cases. In re Madik, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (3d
Dep't 1931), a position rejected by the Court of Appeals in In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196 (1969), revd
sub nT. Jo re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) discussed infra p. 1269.
21. Fittgerald 244 N.Y. at 315.
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But the court took a sharp turn in 1932, in People v. Lewis, in which a fifteen-
year-old boy was accused of breaking into a Grand Union grocery and stealing twelve
dollars. 22 The boy was not warned against self-incrimination and admitted his guilt
to the judge. In considering whether the boy was entitled to the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, the Court of Appeals adopted the ideas of
juvenile court reformers like Julian Mack, who early in the twentieth century wrote
a much-quoted article in the Harvard Law Review setting forth the view that
[t]he problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl
committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is,
and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to
save him from a downward career.23
The court held that the case was not a criminal matter, but rather provided an
opportunity to aid, encourage, and guide a child. Under these circumstances, the
court reasoned that procedural safeguards afforded by the Constitution to those
accused of criminal behavior were not required. 24
Judge Crane, dissenting in Lewis, was remarkably prescient in an opinion that
anticipated the Gault decision that was to come thirty-five years later:
The motives behind all our reform movements are probably commendable
and beyond criticism. Some are ever on the lookout to improve civic conditions
and the morals of the individual by the force of law, and yet, we must be
careful that in these endeavors to correct others, we do not exceed well-
recognized principles of municipal government. Absolute power in the hands
of a careful and just man may be a benefit, but most of our Constitutions have
been adopted out of experience, with human nature as it is, and is apt to be in
the future. We must minimize the chance of abuse and place limitations even
upon those who have the best of purposes and the most benevolent
dispositions. To send a young man to prison for a crime is a serious matter for
him and his family. To take a young lad, filled with the wild dreams of
childhood, from his parents and his home and incarcerate him in a public
institution until he is twenty-one years of age, is equally as serious, and the
consequences are not lessened by the emollient term, 'juvenile delinquency.'2
Though Judge Crane's position was ultimately vindicated in Gault, New York's high
court at first resisted the new juvenile justice regime Gault established. That resistance
surfaced in In re Samuel W, a case decided only two years after Gault. A twelve-year old
was accused of stealing $112 from a woman's purse. 26 New York law required a showing
of guilt by only a preponderance of the evidence. The New York Court of Appeals
adamantly rejected the claim that, after Gault, the criminal law's standard of "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" was required. The majority held that proceedings against
22. 260 N.Y. 171 (1932).
23. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. Rav. 104, 119-20 (1909).
24. Lewis 260 N.Y. at 177.
25. Id. at 181-82 (Crane, J., dissenting).
26. 24 N.Y.2d 196 (1969), rev'd sub noma. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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juveniles under sixteen years of age were civil in nature, not adversarial, and thus should
be informal and paternalistic. The Court of Appeals stubbornly evaded the basic fact,
central to the Gault holding, that the accused boy could be confined in a state institution
and deprived of his liberty for up to six years and was therefore entitled to essential
rights the Constitution grants to any criminally accused person. Judge Bergan, writing
for the majority, sought refuge in the origins of the state juvenile court system, the 1922
Children's Court Act, and its worthy intentions:
[T]he proceedings were not designed to be punitive but were for the protection
and training of a child found in difficulty; and would be administered by humane
and parentally minded Judges whose end was not to punish, but to save the child.
The Judge, acting as a mature and well-balanced parent, tries to find the answer
to the child's trouble; and only if all else fails and there is no other recourse,
does he commit the child to any institution, and even then he tries to find the
one best suited to the child's needs and having the fewest punitive policies. 2
Too broad an interpretation of Gault, Judge Bergan continued, would lead the
juvenile legal process to be ruined by the criminal law's "technicalities" (otherwise
known as constitutional rights). Judge Bergan saw the Gault case as one of those
"hard constitutional cases" that "impaled" the juvenile justice system on its "sharp
points.128 He saw no reason to apply the criminal law's standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to a "noncriminal status determination" of delinquency.29 In dissent,
Chief Judge Fuld contended the reasonable doubt standard was a vital component to
the fact-finding process in all criminal prosecutions and Gault's logic therefore
mandated its adoption in juvenile delinquency cases."
The case, under the name In re Winship, went on to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which rebuked the Bergan majority and explicitly endorsed Fuld's view of the
indispensability of the higher standard of proof in juvenile adjudications.3' In blunt,
unflattering terms, the high court concluded, "We do not find convincing the contrary
arguments of the New York Court of Appeals. Gault rendered untenable much of the
reasoning relied upon by that court. 32 Each argument of Bergan's majority opinion was
recited and found wanting. Fundamental fairness and the basic societal value of not
convicting the innocent required the use of the highest standard of proof.3
27. Id. at 197-98.
28. Id. at 200. Resistance to Gault appeared in other ways throughout the nation. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE. 314-16 (2d ed. 2008).
29. In Re Samuel W., 23 N.Y.2d at 203.
30. See id. at 203-04 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting).
31. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
32. Id. at 365.
33. Id. at 363-64. In 1982, the New York legislature amended the Family Court Act to require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency cases. N.Y. lAM. Ci. ACT § 342.2 (McKinney 2011).
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Winship was followed by a mix of cases that ricocheted between a concern for
juveniles' constitutional rights and a desire both to protect public safety and to leave
room for experimentation. In 1971, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, Chief Justice
Warren Burger concluded that juveniles need not be accorded the right to a jury
trial.34 Jury trials, he wrote, could result in a fully adversarial process that "will put
an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding."3 In Breed v. Jones, the Court ruled that double jeopardy
protection for juveniles was constitutionally required. 3 The next Chief Justice,
William Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Schall v. Martin, found no constitutional
problem with a New York statute allowing pretrial detention of juveniles deemed a
serious risk for committing a crime before trial.3 While noting the juvenile's interest
in freedom before conviction, Rehnquist observed that "juveniles, unlike adults, are
always in some form of custody,"3 as if parental custody bore some similarity to the
accommodations provided by the state juvenile detention center.
Despite the revolutionary nature of Gault, it is important to note its limits. First,
Gault did nothing to promote the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system; its
concern was with proper procedure in the fact-finding phase of juvenile adjudications.
Second, it did not deal with the duration and conditions of incarceration of youth.
Despite the outrage over the six-year sentence imposed on Gerald Gault for making a
lewd phone call (if indeed he did make such a call), the Court had nothing to say about
the issue of unfair sentencing of young people to imprisonment in detention facilities
for petty and nonviolent offenses, nor did Gault address the need for states to provide
sensible alternatives to incarceration. Finally, the decision also contributed little to the
important question of police-youth interactions at school and on the street.
The Gault court's attention to adjudication rights has been a mixed blessing. The
decision has been criticized for failing to see the negative effects of copying the adult
criminal justice system.39 Formal criminal process often means proceedings conducted
in a legal language that is unintelligible to the defendant, who may not understand
the proceedings, much less meaningfully participate, in the process. 40 Due process
procedures often result in brief court appearances, rushed meetings with assigned
counsel, and plea-bargaining that disposes of cases quickly, if not always justly.
Juveniles do not always trust appointed counsel and may not form productive
attorney-client relationships that would aid their own defense. Rules of evidence and
The legislature previously had required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in "persons in need of
supervision" cases, but was amended in 1976. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 744(b) (McKinney 2011).
34. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
35. Id. at 5 45.
36. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
37. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
38. Id. at 265.
39. See Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. Cm. l. REV. 39 (2003).
40. See id. at 39.
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adversarial questioning techniques prevent victims from confronting youthful
offenders directly and offenders from learning from such encounters. 4' Gault may in
fact inhibit experiments with more informal processes that aim to educate and
rehabilitate youth who can be reached in untraditional environments.42 Techniques
of "restorative justice" may not always resemble courtroom practices, but may involve
and educate the offending youth more than the formal processes of the law.
A. New York's Reform Efforts After Gault
"Reform," of course, means different things at different times. In 1982,
responding to the need to reconfigure the juvenile justice process after Gault, the
New York state legislature enacted a set of changes to the Family Court Act.43 The
New York Court of Appeals referred to the reform package as a "sweeping overhaul"
designed "to reflect the significant changes in the legal rights of juveniles that had
occurred since the late 1960's and to standardize practice throughout the State.
44
Establishing procedural regularity, however, only put the final touches to the reforms
initiated by Gault. For New York, and most of the nation, the major changes that recast
the legal rules governing juveniles in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were aimed in a very
different direction. Simply put, there was a determined effort to treat juveniles more
severely. Most states expanded the grounds for steering juvenile cases to adult criminal
court, with New York leading the way.45 The impetus was a powerful fear of juvenile
crime, acknowledged by the New York Court of Appeals in 1976 when it observed that,
although young people in trouble were often victims of neglect, juveniles are also
the perpetrators-of homicides, robberies, burglaries and rapes which
threaten to make the modern city an imprisoning fortress for the old, the
weak and the timid. Probable cause was found here, for instance, to conclude
that this youth had engaged in a mugging which led to the death by
strangulation of a pedestrian on the streets of New York.
46
41. In juvenile cases, the victim does not get to engage in direct conversation with the juvenile offender in
order to tell the youth about the emotional impact of the crime and how it affected the victim's life. In the
courtroom, the lawyers speak for the parties, ask questions, and controls the entire course of communication.
42. See Buss, supra note 39, at 39; Fishman, supra note 12.
43. The changes appear throughout Article 3 of the New York Family Court Act. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. art.
3 (McKinney 2001). Some procedures in Article 3 may be quite strictly interpreted against the State.
For example, in In re Kevin M., a detained juvenile's right to a probable cause hearing no more than four
days after arrest was interpreted to disallow scheduling the hearing on a Monday when the fourth day
fell on a Saturday. The court reasoned that the State must be constrained to limit juveniles' exposure to
excess pre-petition detention. 925 N.Y.S.2d. 194 (2d Dep't. 2011).
44. In re Frank C., 70 N.Y.2d 408, 413 (1987).
45. See Mosi Secret, States Prosecute Fewer Teenagers in Adult Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 2011, at Al. The
expansion was accomplished "either by lowering the age of criminal responsibility or increasing the
number of offenses for which juveniles could be prosecuted as adults, with most of the changes
happening in the 1990s." Id.
46. People ex ref. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 690-91 (1976) (upholding a law permitting pre-trial
detention of youths who might commit crimes before cases can be heard). At the century's end, in In re
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The epidemic in the use of drugs and the public response that followed resulted
in the infamous 1973 Rockefeller Drug Laws, the harshest laws in the nation aimed
at combating the drug trade through lengthy, mandatory sentences for the sale and
possession of even small quantities of illegal substances. 4 Soon state prisons were
filled with low-level drug addicts and sellers serving long sentences, while a crack
cocaine epidemic roared on. Decades later, another New York governor, David
Paterson, summed up the law's ineffectiveness by saying, "I can't think of a criminal
justice strategy that has been more unsuccessful than the Rockefeller Drug Laws. ' 4 '
Unfortunately, the laws stayed on the books for decades.49
Legislators are sensitive to public attitudes about juvenile crime, and a single horrific
incident can ignite efforts to crack down on all juveniles. In 1978, New Yorkers were
frightened and angered over the murder of two people on the subway by a youth named
Willie Bosket, a fifteen-year-old who, because of his age, was sentenced to only five
years in jail.50 Public outrage over the short sentence prompted the state legislature to
enact the Juvenile Offender Act of 1978 (the "JO Law"), which lowered the age at
which many juveniles could be tried as adults. For homicide, the age went down to
thirteen and for other selected felonies (assault, arson, burglary, robbery, kidnapping,
and rape) to fourteen. 5' The general age for adult criminal responsibility stayed at the
already low age of sixteen, where it was set in 19092 and where it remains today.'"
Looking across the country, thirty-eight states have set the age of adult responsibility at
eighteen, nine states at seventeen, one state at seventeen for felonies and eighteen for
misdemeanors, and only two states, North Carolina and New York, fix it at age sixteen?"
Raymond G., the court was voicing concern about a "perceived epidemic of violent criminal conduct by
juveniles." 93 N.Y.2d 531, 534 (1999).
47. Madison Gray, A Brief History of New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws, TIME (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888864,00.html. The law included "mandatory minimum
sentences of 15 years to life for possession of four ounces of narcotics-about the same as a sentence for
second-degree murder." Id. See generally, Act of May 8, 1973, chs. 276, 277, 278, 676, 1051, 1973 N.Y.
Laws 371 (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220 (McKinney 2009)).
48. Gray, supra note 47.
49. Id. (describing a minor amendment in 1979 to reduce marijuana possession sanctions and a significant
reform in 2004 intended to relax the laws' harsh sentencing guidelines).
50. John Eligon, Two Decades in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at B1. After his release, Bosket
committed an assault and received a lengthy prison sentence; the Times reported that he was put in
solitary confinement for two decades. Id.
51. See 1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 431§ 28 (current version at PENAL § 30.00(2)).
52. See Merril Sobie,Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 N.Y. PRAC., NE W YORE FAMILY COURT PRACTICE
§ 11:1.
53. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2010); PENAL § 30.00(2). Advocates like Judge Michael
Corriero, a participant in the April 29, 2011 Juvenile Justice Reform in New York symposium, have been
seeking to raise the age to seventeen or eighteen. Supra note 11; Michael Corriero, Judging Children as
Children:" Redlaiming New York's Progressive Tradition, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1413, 1424 (2011-12); see also
Andrew Schepard, Raising New York s Age oJ Criminal Responsibilityjor Juvenies, 245 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2011).
54. Merril Sobie, SUPPLEMENTARY PRACTICE COMMENTARIES TO N.Y. PAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 (McKinney
2011).
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The JO Law "has been characterized as the most punitive delinquency law in the
nation."5 The law's proponents sought to deter serious juvenile crime by increasing
punishments and directing serious youth crime to the adult criminal system.56
Professor Andrew Schepard has summarized the difference it makes when young
offenders are deemed adults, stating, "These youth face trial as adults in criminal
rather than family court, sentencing emphasizing punishment rather than
rehabilitation, confinement in adult jails with other adult criminal offenders, and the
enduring stigma and collateral consequences of an adult criminal record."57 Some of
these juveniles may be waived to family court, but the process must start in adult
criminal court and waiver subsequently approved by a judge."
The effects of the law on crime rates were disappointing. A study reported that
the evidence indicated no effect on homicides or assault, rape or arson, and a possible,
but doubtful, effect on robbery. "Overall, the analysis most strongly supports the
conclusion that the JO Law did not affect juvenile crime."" Of course the law had
other goals, namely the incapacitation of perpetrators and retribution for their crimes.
But simply getting tough on crime did not seem to turn the problem of serious
juvenile crime around. Many experts have since found that mixing juveniles and
adults in the correctional system increases juvenile recidivism and transforms juvenile
offenders into career criminals.60
As the turn of the century approached, a report on juvenile justice observed:
During the past 20 years, a nationwide trend to get tough on crime has resulted
in a much harsher approach to meting out justice for children and adolescents
who break the law. Virtually every state has expanded the charges for which
juvenile offenders can be tried as adults, lowered the age at which it can be done,
and increased the severity of punishment for juveniles convicted of a crime.6'
In New York, public attitudes about crime and youth were profoundly affected by
a particularly horrific crime that occurred in 1989. A young woman, jogging one day
in Central Park, was viciously attacked, beaten with a pipe, raped, and left for dead.62
A group of boys, mostly fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds, African American and
5 S. Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York
Juvenile Offender Law, 22 Law & Soc'Y REV. 521, 522 (1988).
56. See id.
57. See Schepard, supra note 53.
58. Id.; see also Inre Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 531 (1999).
59. Singer &McDowall, supra note 55, at 531.
60. Mark Soler et al., Symposium, Juvenile Justice. Lessonsfor a New Era, 16 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
483, 498-99 (2009).
61. JOHN D. & CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUNDATION, YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000), http://www.mac-adoldev-juvjustice.org/youthnews4.pdf.
62. David E. Pitt, Jogger's Attackers Terrorized at Least 9 in 2 Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1989, at 11. The
jogger later disclosed her identity and wrote of her experience. See TRISHA MEILI, I AM THE CENTRAL
PARR JOGGER: A STORY OF HOPE AND POSSIBILITY (2003).
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Latino, were arrested, charged with the crime, and convicted after the police had
obtained confessions from them. Anyone living in New York City at the time may
recall the extraordinary level of fear and outrage generated by this crime. A
commentator looking back on the event recalled:
At the time of the trial they were vilified by the media, which depicted them
as inchoate, predatory animals. It didn't matter that there was no physical
evidence-not a drop of blood or a speck of mud-linking them to the
bludgeoned rape victim. Four of the defendants had confessed. That their
confessions were wildly inconsistent and inaccurate didn't sway the court....
"Lock them up!" the media ranted. "Execute them!" people demanded.
Donald Trump took out full-page newspaper ads advocating reinstatement of
the death penalty.63
The term "wilding" was supposedly used by one of the initial suspects and caught the
media's attention as a way to describe the barbarism of the group.6 4 The youths
disavowed their confessions, went to trial, and were found guilty. It was not until
many years later, after the five boys spent between seven and thirteen years in prison,
that DNA evidence and a confession by a serial rapist showed the crime had been not
been committed by any of the convicted teenagers. 61
Finally, in 1999, just before the new millennium, one of the worst crimes in U.S.
history occurred. Two boys took a slew of guns to their high school in Littleton,
Colorado and indiscriminately murdered twelve fellow students and a teacher, and
then took their own lives.66 The name Columbine would be forever associated with
the two young killers whose crime outraged and traumatized the nation. It was not a
good time to advocate for juvenile justice reform.
II. THE CURRENT CRISIS AND BEYOND
Currently, a reform effort in juvenile justice is well underway. The crisis that has
given impetus to the renewed movement in New York stems from problems far
different than those that concerned the Supreme Court in Gault. Investigations have
exposed defects in a sprawling system that extends far beyond the courtroom. A
primary focus of the investigations has been on post-adjudication treatment of
delinquent youth in detention facilities scattered throughout New York State. Some
of these places have been the scene of unconscionable physical abuse of juvenile
inmates, resulting in injuries that include broken bones, broken teeth, and, in a few
cases, death.67 These events have been exposed in investigations and reports from
63. Glyn Vincent, Central Park Jogger Case: Forgotten Victims, HUIFINGTON POST (June 24, 2009, 2:00
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/glyn-vincent/central-park-joggeronly-a b 217948.html.
64. Rober F. Worth, A Crime Revisited: Wi/ding; a Word that Seared a City's Imagination, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 6,
2002, at B4.
65. See Maggie Nelson, The Central Park Jogger Case Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011, at BR23.
66. Jenniter Senior, The End of the Trench Coat Mafia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at BR13 (noting that the
two killers had hombs which, had they exploded, would have killed 500 people).
67. See TASK FORCE, supra note 7.
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both official sources and private organizations." These facilities, often located
hundreds of miles from the homes and families of detainees, have operated with
insufficient resources to address the needs of their young populations. In addition to
closing the worst of these facilities and improving the rest, the state needs to divert
youth from high-cost residential facilities to lower cost alternative programs that
monitor and educate them, help them overcome drug addiction and mental health
problems, direct them to productive pursuits, and keep them out of trouble.
Is reform likely to succeed in New York? Significant reform of any public system
requires: (1) a major effort directed to sounding the alarm-that is, letting the public
know that something is seriously wrong with the system's present functioning; and
(2) a determined effort to develop solutions and alternatives, guided by advocates
with the expertise to know what needs to be done and endorsed by political leaders
with the power to see that the necessary reforms are ultimately adopted.
But these actions, though necessary, are not always sufficient. A public-sphere
reform effort, by its nature, faces formidable and inevitable obstacles: the inertia that
leads things to stay as they are unless a countervailing force arises; the tendency of
bureaucratic culture to resist change and continue to habitually and dogmatically do
whatever they have been doing; the active opposition from those involved in the
current system who benefit from the status quo and will fight any changes that
might disadvantage them; the monetary costs of change, especially in a time of
budget shortfalls; and the difficulty of securing and maintaining the support of
political leaders and of the general public over the time span needed to effect reform.
A. Sounding the Alarm: The Pivotal Role of the New York Times
In the modern age, no one doubts the important role of the media in effecting
social change. News articles that expose unseemly practices, coupled with editorials
that influence public opinion and prod public officials to act, are common features of
successful reform campaigns.69
In the current effort to reform juvenile justice in New York, the New York Times
(the "Times") has played a central role in sounding the alarm by drawing public
attention, through news articles and editorials, to problems within the system. The
problems exposed have been dramatic. The Times reported on the November 2006
death of a fifteen-year-old boy, Darryl Thompson, who died in custody when he was
physically restrained by two guards at the Tryon Boys Residential Center in
Johnstown, New York. 0 The same Times story also noted the earlier investigation
68. See supra text accompanying notes 3-10.
69. This is most clearly evident in the major domestic upheaval of the twentieth century: the civil rights
movement. For an excellent account of the crucial role of the press, see GENE RoBERTS & HANK
KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A
NATION (2007).
70. Cassi Feldman, State Facilities' Use of Force is ScrutinizedAfter a Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at §1.
Ak case against the two guards was presented to a local grand jury, which refused to issue an indictment.
See Rick Carlin, Ex-]iryoo Aide Had Record of Abuse, TIMES UNION (Alhany), Aug. 17, 2010, at A3. For
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and report by Human Rights Watch and the ACLU, which detailed the violent
mistreatment of girls at two other state juvenile detention facilities."1 The story noted
allegations of sexual abuse as well as the use of excessive physical force against female
inmates by staff officers. Although many inmates were from New York City, the
facilities were located in upstate areas, far from the girls' homes.
Use of excessive force by guards was the subject of many Times articles in 2009
and 2010, several written by one reporter, Nicholas Confessore, who developed
critical expertise about the juvenile detention system. Confessore wrote in August
2009 of the "broken bones, shattered teeth, concussions and dozens of other serious
injuries over a period of less than two years" suffered by young detainees.72 These
startling accusations were made by DOJ investigators who had examined conditions
at four state detention centers. The article quoted the investigators' finding that
"'[a]nything from sneaking an extra cookie to initiating a fistfight may result in a full
prone restraint with handcuffs, ' ' 73 highlighting in dramatic fashion the indiscriminate
and routine use of force in detention centers.
Another hard-hitting story by Confessore, in December 2009, began, "New
York's system of juvenile prisons is broken, with young people battling mental illness
or addiction held alongside violent offenders in abysmal facilities where they receive
little counseling, can be physically abused and rarely get even a basic education."74 The
reporter quoted from a draft report (labeled "confidential," but given to the Times in
advance) by the Governor's Task Force, the blue-ribbon panel appointed by David
Paterson to advise him on reform of the state's juvenile justice system. The task force
concluded that the problems of excessive force detailed by the DOJ extended well
beyond the four institutions that were the subject of the federal investigation.75
This lengthy Times story over 1200 words-also stressed the high cost of
incarceration (roughly $210,000 per inmate per year), the high recidivism rate
(seventy-five percent re-arrested within three years of their release), the limited
resources available to cope with the widespread addiction and mental health problems
of the prison population, the confinement of many juveniles who had committed only
minor crimes, and the fact that inmates were drawn disproportionately from black
and Latino communities. Although most of the detained youth were from New York
City, the prisons were nearly all upstate and virtually inaccessible to their families.76
This story also reported that Commissioner Carridn had advised family court
judges to try, whenever possible, to avoid placing juveniles in the state's detention
a collection of news articles on the matter see COALITION AGAINST INSTITUTIONALIZED CHILD ABUSE,
ArchivedNews, http://www.caica.org/CAICA-NEWSCURRENT.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
71. Feldman, supra note 70. For the report issued by Human Rights Watch and the ACLU, see AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9.
72. Nicholas Confessore, 4 Youth Prisons in New York Used Excessive Force, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at Al.
73. Id. (quoting DEP'T OF JuSTICE INVESTIGATION,supra note 3).
74. Nicholas Confessore, New Yorh Finds Extreme Crisis in Youth3 Prisons. N.Y. TIMES. Dec.14. 2009, at A1.
75. Id.; see a/so TASK FORCE, so/ira note 7.
76. Id.
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facilities, admitting that they were inferior to alternative programs for most
delinquents. Finally, the article covered the opposition of prison employees to reform,
an important theme in later stories on the politics of reform; workers claimed Ms.
Carridn's effort to restrain the use of force by guards had contributed to more injuries
suffered by the guards.
Within three weeks, another article by Confessore appeared, announcing the
filing of a lawsuit by The Legal Aid Society alleging the use of excessive force by
prison staff against particular juveniles and further claiming the absence of adequate
treatment for inmates' mental illnesses.77 Confessore took the opportunity to remind
his readers of the two "withering reports" on the juvenile prison system (by the DOJ
and the Governor's Task Force), and noted that the State, in negotiating with the
federal government to avoid a federal takeover of the prisons, was attempting to
address the additional problems of "inadequate psychological and drug abuse
counseling, and substandard education.178 He also wrote that Commissioner Carri6n
had instituted new rules on the use of force in 2007 and had encountered opposition
from the union representing the prison staff, a point Confessore had made in a
preceding article. 79
Two more articles appeared the next month. A Times report on the merger of two
New York City departments, the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)
and the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS), appeared on
January 21, 2010.'o The goal of the merger was to increase the use of alternatives to
incarceration, employing the resources of ACS to provide in-home programs for young
offenders, including restrictions on behavior, curfews, education, and help for parents
in improving parenting skills. The article mentioned the "notorious" state juvenile
prisons, described as "broken, ineffective and dangerous" by the Governor's Task Force,
and reiterated their expense (given there as $215,000 per youth annually).8 Jeremy
Travis, chair of the task force, was quoted as saying: "Our No. 1 recommendation was
that the state system ofjuvenile justice be downsized" and "community-based strategies"
be employed instead.82
On January 27, 2010, Confessore was again at work, reporting on the decision of
a state supreme court judge who had ordered prison guards to stop shackling all
young prisoners when transporting them to court appearances." The specific case
involved a fourteen-year-old youth who was taken 200 miles from an upstate jail to a
Manhattan courthouse. The boy had been in shackles (described as having his
77. See Confessore, supra note 6; Complaint at 1, G.B. v Carrion, 09 Civ 10582 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 30,
2009).
78. Confessore, supra note 6.
79. Id.
80. Julie Bosman, City Signals Intent to Put Fewer Teenagers in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A31.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Nicholas Confessore, Judge Bars Youth Prisons from Routine Shackling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A21.
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"hands and feet handcuffed, with a belly chain linked to the handcuffs") for about
fifteen hours on a single day.84 State policy called for restraints for young prisoners
who were nonviolent, even for those who were in non-secure facilities for offenses
"like truancy, graffiti or petty theft." The judge found the policy on shackling a
violation of state law, which permitted restraints only for dangerous prisoners who
could not be controlled otherwise. The Legal Aid Society staff attorney, Nancy
Rosenbloom, was quoted as condemning the "culture of abusive practices" that "does
not recognize that these are children who are in the care of the state."85 Once again,
Confessore reiterated the system's problems with this reminder: "It is the latest
controversy for a system that has been widely faulted for doing what critics say is an
abysmal job of meeting the needs of juvenile offenders."86
OCFS revised its shackling policy the next week, as reported by a new Confessore
piece.87 In a memorandum issued by Deputy Commissioner Joyce Burrell, the new
policy barred the combination of handcuffs, foot cuffs, and waist belts for any
transported prisoners. Full shackles were permitted only in highly secure facilities, to
be used when a youth was deemed dangerous. The article again spotlighted the
conflict between the agency and its workers union, which complained that worker
safety was jeopardized by the agency's new rule. 8
Another article followed a week later, on yet another aspect of the systemic problem.
Reporter Julie Bosman wrote of the woeful lack of mental health personnel in juvenile
facilities, in an article dramatically headlined "For 800 Youths Jailed by State, Not One
Full-Time Psychiatrist."89 The article explained that only seventeen part-time
psychiatrists were available throughout the juvenile prison system, supplemented by
"several dozen psychologists who visit them for consultations, and staff members at the
jails who run group therapy sessions despite often having no qualifications beyond a
high school degree."9 Some juveniles were assigned multiple and varying diagnoses of
mental disorders and received questionable treatment. The article reminded readers of
the DOJ report and its condemnation of "four notorious state juvenile prisons."9 '
Confessore returned to the beat with "A Glimpse Inside a Troubled Youth Prison,"
an account of the sometimes-miserable experience of a young man confined at the
state's Highland Residential Center. 92 The facility itself is described as "a drab
collection of run-down cottages... part of a state juvenile prison system under fire for
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Nicholas Confessore, Officials Bar Shackling ofJuvenile Offenders, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A28.
88. See id.
89. Julie Bosman, For 800 Youths Jailed by State, Not One Full-Time Psychiatrist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010,
atAl.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Nicholas Confessore, A Glimpse Inside a Troohled Youth Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at MB1.
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its abysmal and sometimes dangerous conditions. 93 The featured youth had emotional
problems, but "[n]o one seemed to care whether he took his pills, so he didn't. 94 One
therapist he saw soon left the job, another saw him for a short time but also vanished.
The boy was wary of group therapy where, he said, "'you don't want to show no
weakness."'9' Others at Highland, as described by Confessore, included a suicidal
inmate who was never treated and another who, though moderately mentally retarded,
was repeatedly physically restrained, "including one episode in which a worker banged
his head against the floor."96 Commissioner Carri6n is quoted as saying she thought the
experience of youth like the one featured in the piece "'makes my case for transformation
of the juvenile justice system. He makes my case for why we need change."'97
The summer of 2010 brought two new Confessore articles. The first described a
proposal by then-Governor Paterson to reduce the population of juvenile detention
sites by barring judges from sending low-level offenders to juvenile detention.98 The
article reviewed the past history of these facilities, repeating the findings by the DOJ
of "broken bones and shattered teeth" resulting from staff members' use of excessive
force and the findings of the Governor's Task Force that the system was "broken
almost beyond repair," and burdened by "abysmal facilities," "little counseling or
schooling," and "physical abuse." 9
The second article covered the newly signed settlement between the DOJ and New
York, in which the State agreed to sharply restrict the use of force by guards and
substantially expand the availability of mental health personnel for juvenile detention
facilities.'00 The article repeated the charges of brutality by guards ("broken bones,
shattered teeth, concussions and dozens of other serious injuries in a period of less than
two years") and recalled the 2006 death of a teen at the Tryon center.1°1 It also
mentioned the recommendations of the Governor's Task Force. Commissioner Carri6n
was quoted as approving the changes required by the agreement and indicated her
intent to extend the agreement's terms on the use of forcible restraints, originally
applicable to only four prisons, to all of the other prisons under her jurisdiction.
Taken together, the entire set of news articles in the Times painted a vivid picture
of a dysfunctional juvenile detention system. Reporters repeatedly described detention
conditions as "abysmal" and the official investigation reports as "withering," while
supplying hard facts to back up these characterizations. The articles portrayed
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Bill Would Begin Overhaul of Youth Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010,
at A28.
99. Id.
100. Nicholas Confessore, Federal OMesight-for PrubledN.Y Youth Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at Al.
101. Id.
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Commissioner Carridn as an honest public official trying to reform the system under
her administration. Meanwhile, prison employee unions seemed to always be in a
defensive struggle to justify the behavior of their members.
Supplementing the Times news coverage was a series of emphatic, pro-reform
editorials pressing the "powers-that-be" to act boldly to change the system. A May
23, 2008 editorial called on Congress to compel the states, through conditions on
federal funding, to end the practice of sending juveniles under eighteen years of age
to adult prisons. 0 2 The young inmates were "at greater risk of being raped, battered
or pushed to suicide," as well as of becoming "damaged people who are much more
likely to commit crimes and return to prison." ''"3 Seven weeks later, the newspaper
urged much less reliance on incarceration and greater employment of community-
based treatments for juvenile offenders.0 4 Too many young offenders who do not
pose a threat to the community, the Times stated, are sent to distant residential
facilities in upstate New York, far from their homes. Reliance on community-based
programs would increase public safety because those programs produced much lower
recidivism rates. And the greater use of community programs, with their emphasis
on counseling both youth and their families, would lower costs significantly, as
detention costs the state approximately $200,000 per year per child, and community
programs cost $20,000 per year per child. The Times added sharp criticism of labor
unions and legislators who sought to prevent the closure of upstate facilities in order
to keep local jobs.'0 5
Another editorial commentary, entitled "Rikers Horror Story," appeared on
January 29, 2009. 106 It noted the indictment of three officers in the death of an inmate
at Rikers Island youth prison. The indictment charged that the guards had "used
violent inmates to ride herd over others, sanctioned assaults on inmates and decided
when, where and how they would take place."' ' The guards protected the gang of
enforcers. The editors called for a change in the culture at Rikers: "clearly, the city
needs to do a much better job of training and supervising corrections officers there." ' 8
A December 17, 2009 editorial urged Congress to make rules discouraging states
from confining youth in adult jails (except for "truly heinous criminals").0 9 The
editors repeated their earlier conviction that confining youth in such settings,
including those merely awaiting trial, "places them at risk of being raped or battered
and increases the chance they will end up as career criminals.""' The editorial
102. Editorial, Children in Adult Jails, N.Y. TiMEs, May 23, 2008, at A24.
103. Id.
104. Editorial, Help Closer to Home, N.Y. TiMES, July 11, 2008, at A16.
105. Id.
106. Editorial, Rikers Horror Story, Jan. 29, 2009, at A26.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Editorial, De-Criminalizing Children, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 17, 2009, at A46.
110. Id.
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recalled that progress in juvenile rehabilitation had flagged since the 1990s, when
"unfounded fears of an adolescent crime wave reached hysterical levels."'11
A January 2010 editorial summed up all the objections to the juvenile prison
system and told the governor and legislators to "pay attention." 1 12 In strong terms, the
editors condemned the institutions' "terrible job of rehabilitation," their "disastrous
and inhumane" environments, and their use of force "often for minor offenses such as
laughing too loudly or refusing to get dressed.""' The repeated criticisms contained in
the "damning reports" from the DOJ, the Governor's Task Force, and The Legal Aid
Society lawsuit justified strong measures, including shutting down select prisons. The
editors praised the "reform-minded" Commissioner Carrion and expressed contempt
for the "fierce and predictably self-interested resistance from the unions representing
workers in juvenile prisons and their allies in Albany.""' Its exasperated conclusion
was that "the Legislature will finally have to put the needs of the state's children
ahead of the politically powerful unions and upstate lawmakers who want to preserve
jobs-and the disastrous status quo-at all costs."' 15
In June 2010, the Times supported reform proposals to "fix this broken system.
'
"
11 6
Governor Paterson's reform ideas could "improve the quality of the leadership and
care in the state's often dangerous and inhumane juvenile facilities.""' 7 The editorial
declared that the "argument for closing down the worst facilities and treating low-
risk children in their home communities is irrefutable."" ' Juveniles who had
committed "minor, nonviolent offenses" did not belong in places rife with abuse and
short on help. It commended Commissioner Carrion for closing down a dozen
centers and saving $30 million in the process, and lamented the fact that only $5
million of this sum went into community-based efforts (the rest went into the state's
general coffers). It noted the $200,000 cost per child per year of confinement dwarfed
the cost of non-institutional care. State employee unions were singled out as the
selfish enemies of reform; the Times told state legislators to "stand up to unions that
are more interested in preserving jobs than in dong what is best for children."" 9
Money was the subject of an October 2010 editorial that decried the wasteful
spending on New York juvenile detention facilities, which was costing New York
taxpayers $170 million a year.'20 The editors highlighted the fact that the state was
11]. Id.
112. See Editorial, Juven/elInjustice, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 6, 2010, at A22.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Editorial, RealJusticej rJiveniles, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010, at A30.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. IL
120. See Editorial, Two4 Wods." Wast Jidand Ineffective, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at A22; see also N.Y.
CORRECT. LAWX § 79-a(3)(iii) (McKinney 2011).
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paying over "2,000 employees to oversee fewer than 700 children."121 Detention was
criticized as ineffective as well-with a recidivism rate of approximately eighty
percent for young men, who "end up committing more crimes within a few years of
their release. 122 The editors repeated their desire to see the State "close down as
many of these facilities as possible, preserving only the few necessary to hold
genuinely dangerous young offenders.1123 Instead, they suggested, send low-risk
youth to community programs "that do a much better job of rehabilitation and are far
less expensive to manage.'124 They cited figures similar, but not identical, to the ones
quoted in the past-local programs that cost "as little as $15,000 a year, compared
with the estimated $220,000 to house a child in a state facility."1 25 The Times, once
again, encouraged the governor to "stand up to the labor unions" opposing closures;
praised Commissioner Carridn for closing a dozen centers in three years; and
criticized the legislature for enacting the 2006 law requiring a full year's notice to
workers before closing an unneeded facility.
Anticipating the arrival of newly elected Governor Andrew Cuomo, the Times in
December 2010 reiterated its belief that more "ruinously expensive, and half-empty
juvenile detention facilities must be closed." 12 6 Recounting facts and figures on the
lessening population of incarcerated youth-" drop [ping] from more than 2,300 a
decade ago to about 650 today"-the editors called the waste of funds spent on
paying 1560 staffers "indefensible at a time when the state is cutting education and
medical care for the indigent."'' 27 The editors, again, cited the effectiveness and cost
savings of using community-based programs, chided Governor Paterson for not
closing more facilities, and told Governor-Elect Cuomo to "take on the state's
powerful unions" as he pledged to do during his gubernatorial campaign. 128 "Shut
those doors," the editorial's headline demanded.
All of these forceful editorials certainly strengthened the hand of reform
advocates, bringing the problems of juvenile justice to the forefront and raising the
stakes for public officials who have the power to act and feel the eyes of the nation's
most important newspaper scrutinizing them. Nevertheless, for these blunt and
blistering editorials to have a real impact, a set of reform-minded individuals must be
in place who are willing to take up the call and who are capable of providing both
political leadership and policymaking expertise.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Editorial, Shut Those Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 200 at A24.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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B. The Reform Vanguard. The Key Individuals in the Reform Movement
Like a play, a reform movement must have a compelling cast of characters who
can move the action along to a satisfactory conclusion. In New York, the characters
in the reform movement include public officials and private sector organizations that
need to work together. Some of the key players in the state are highlighted below:
1. Gladys Carridn
Perhaps the most central figure in the reform movement in New York State is
Gladys Carri6n, appointed as commissioner of OCFS by Governor Eliot Spitzer in
January 2007. This post puts her in charge of the state's institutions for confinement
of delinquents1 29 Carri6n has earned a reputation as a blunt-speaking, determined
administrator who is committed to changing the way the state's juvenile facilities are
operated. Indeed, her most notable initiative was that of closing down over a dozen
facilities, including the notorious Tryon Boys facility that was the scene of a teenage
resident's death in 2006 and the subject of scathing criticism by the DOJ. 130 Carridn
agrees that her agency's facilities provide a "toxic environment" for youth.' 31 From
2006 to 2010, Carrion cut the number of incarcerated youth from 1500 to 755.32 She
has had cameras installed to document and deter mistreatment, promulgated rules
that limit staff use of physical restraint and require the reporting of all such incidents,
and shifted resources to local programs that emphasize rehabilitation and
counseling. 3 ' Judith Kaye, the former Chief Judge of New York, calls Carridn's
efforts "heroic."
134
Carridn has used the criticism leveled at the juvenile prison system to fuel her
efforts. Rather than reacting defensively or issuing "no comment" responses to public
criticism, she welcomes even harsh scrutiny for its use by her "as a lever": "If it takes
this report [referring to the sharply critical Governor's Task Force report] to push
through change, then good."' 35
129. See About the Commissioner Gladys Carrion, Esq., NEw YORK STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY
SERVICES, http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/about/commissioner.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
130. For an overview of life at the Tryon center, see Jennifer Gonnerman, The Lost Boys of Tryon, N.Y. MAn.,
Jan. 24, 2010, http://nymag.com/news/features/63239/. Tryon's boys center was closed in January 2011.
Michael Anich, Tryon Half-closed; Other Half Waits, THE LEADER-HERALD, Feb. 9, 2011, http://www.
leaderherald.com/page/content.detail/id/534735/Tryon-half- closed-other-half-waits.html?nav=5011.
131. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Shutting Upstate Jails for City Kids Has Made a Fiery Bronx Bureaucrat Host of
Lnemies, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Aug. 4, 2010), http:/www.villagevoice.com/20100-8-04/news/gladys-
carrion-upstate-jails-for-city-kids-bronx/.
132. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Kids in Detention: Four State Employees to Watch Them., THE VILLAGE VOICE (May
20, 2010, 11:59 PM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2010/05/kids-in-detenti.php.
133. Nicholas Confessore, Official in Charge of State's Youth Prisons Welcomes a Critical Report, N.Y. TiMES,
Dec. 16, 2009, at A36.
134. See Kaye, supra note 12.
135. Confessore, supra note 133.
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Her battles with employee unions are titanic. Each side publicly attacks the
other. Carridn blames the unions and civil service rules for protecting abusive guards
and making it nearly impossible to eliminate the use of excessive force by staff.'36
Meanwhile, union leaders charge that she understates the dangers faced by workers
dealing with inmates who are difficult to control. One incident that union leaders
cite as an example, and which workers recall well, is the following assault at the
Tryon facility:
Tryon's most infamous resident-on-staff assault took place inside the mental-
health unit in the summer of 2008, when a 60-year-old YDA [Youth Division
Aide] named Charles Loftly was on duty. A teenager tricked Loftly into
opening the door to his room, grabbed a piece of wood from his desk, and
cracked him on the back of the head. Five weeks later, Loftly had a stroke
and slipped into a coma. He died shortly after. According to the coroner, his
death had nothing to do with the attack. Within the walls of Tryon, however,
everyone blames the job."7
But the independent investigations of Tryon and other youth institutions in the
system reported widespread abuse by staffers. When union leaders claimed that
worker injuries were increasing, Ms. Carridn expressed her belief that some staffers
were inciting inmates in order to boost the number of alleged staff injuries." 8
As Tryon's population wound down prior to its closure, the union managed to
preserve staff jobs at the facility. When the number of boys in residence shrunk down
to four, the staff numbered 129, thanks to a law that required the state to notify workers
a full year in advance of a facility's closing." 9 Some workers even collected extra pay for
overtime. "This is called a union problem," said the commissioner at a public event in
midtown Manhattan. 40 The New York State Public Employees Federation had sought
the one-year notice law and succeeded in passing the legislation in 2006.' 1 A union
leader defended the staffing levels at Tryon and faulted the commissioner, stating, "It's
strange that you have the commissioner of an agency who has made it her mission to
shut her own agency down."'1 42
State legislators, friendly to the unions (which contribute to the politicians'
campaigns) are also quick to attack Carridn; one state senator, Catharine Young, has
136. Id.
137. Gonnerman, supra note 130, at 9.
138. Dwoskin, supra note 132; Dwoskin, sup-ra note 131 (reporting that Carri6n stated that video evidence
and research prove this occurs).
139. Dwoskin, supra note 132. The notice period was changed to two months in 2011. See N.Y. ExEc. LAw
§ 501.15 (McKinney 2011); Joel Stashenko, Cuomo Wins Battle to Close Some Troubled Youth Facilities,
245 N.Y.L.J. 1, (2011).
140. Dwoskin, sapra note 132.
141. Ross Buetrner, Bloomberg Makes a Proposal/on Youth Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, at A26.
142. Dwoskin, supra note 132.
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organized a "Senate Republican Task Force on Juvenile Justice Reform" to coordinate
the anti-Carri6n efforts.
143
2. Andrew Cuomo
To reform a statewide system, the support of the governor is crucial. The state's
present governor, Andrew Cuomo, signaled his support of the effort to improve the
juvenile justice system in his first State of the State address. Cuomo included the
following passage in his speech:
For those of us who are old enough to remember Willowbrook [a notorious
state residence for the mentally retarded, closed because of its inhumane
conditions' 4 ], it brings back very bad memories. When we think about our
current juvenile justice facilities, I believe there are echoes of what we dealt
with in Willowbrook. You have juvenile justice facilities today where we have
young people who are incarcerated in these state programs who are receiving...
treatment that has already been proven to be ineffective; recidivism rates in the
90 percentile. The cost to the taxpayer is exorbitant. For one child, over
$200,000 per year. The reason we continue to keep these children in these
programs that aren't serving them but are bilking the taxpayers is that we don't
want to lose the state jobs that we would lose if we closed the facilities. I
understand, I understand, the importance of keeping jobs. I understand the
importance of keeping jobs especially in upstate New York. I also understand
that that does not justify the burden on the taxpayer and the violation of civil
rights of the young person who is in a program that they don't need where
they're not being treated hundreds of miles from their home just to save state
jobs. An incarceration program is not an employment program. If people need
jobs, let's get people jobs. Don't put other people in prison to give some people
jobs. Don't put other people in juvenile justice facilities to give some people
jobs. That's not what this state is all about and that has to end this session. 45
The newly elected governor followed this speech with a press release that said he
promised to
undertake an immediate reorganization of the state's youth detention facilities
with the goal of consolidation, while providing current staff the priority for
relocation to other facilities, retraining, and/or reemployment opportunities. To
avoid keeping facilities open that have few or no children, he proposed a repeal of
the requirement mandating a 12-month notice requirement to close facilities.' 46
Eventually, the governor got the closure notice rule reduced to two months.
147
143. Dwoskin, supra note 131.
144. See State and Families Reach FinalAccord Over Wilowbrook, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,1987, at B3.
145. Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, N.Y. State of the State Address (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.governor.
ny.gov/s12/stateofthestate20lltranscript.
146. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Delivers State of the State Message in
Poughkeepsie (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://wwxw.governor.ny gov/press/12011messagepoghkeepsie.
147. Stashenko, supra note 139.
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3. Michael Bloomberg
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg has also weighed in on reform efforts,
supporting the shift from incarceration to rehabilitation programs. Early in 2010, he
merged the New York City DJJ and ACS, which is the city's child welfare arm that
responds to child abuse and neglect problems and supervises foster care placements,
among other child welfare duties. There is much important common ground between
the agencies; many delinquents are abused or neglected children, and many have
been in the foster care system. 148 The merger encourages the development of more
juvenile services that are oriented toward providing intensive supervision and help to
both the target children and families who need to learn more about effective
parenting. ACS had already begun a "Juvenile Justice Initiative" in 2007 that created
programs, in cooperation with nonprofit groups, that provide community-based
social service alternatives to juvenile incarceration. This city effort anticipated the
Governor's Task Force recommendation that fewer juvenile detention centers be
operated by the state and that non-dangerous youth who commit minor crimes be
assigned to rehabilitative programs rather than jail. One of ACS's early moves in
2011 was to close down the Bridges Juvenile Center in the Bronx, a center with an
abusive reputation, formerly known as Spofford.149
At the end of 2010, Mayor Bloomberg pursued greater authority for the city over
juvenile detention. He announced his intention to ask the state to give local
governments control over youth services, including detention facilities. He argued
this would keep the juveniles closer to home, reduce the high recidivism rates for
those currently being sent to distant upstate jails, and save the local government
substantial payments required for sending youth into the state system. According to
the state's contribution formula, New York City had to pay $62 million to the state
for incarcerating a daily average of 569 offenders in a recent year.5 0 These payments
have increased over time despite the fact that the number of offenders has fallen, in
part because the state has kept open near-empty facilities and charged the city a
share of the costs to staff them. The city has responded with a lawsuit to stop the
state from imposing costs stemming from underused and mismanaged facilities.5 1
148. See Bosman, supra note 80. A journalist visiting the Tryon facility for boys reported:
The rap sheets of the boys at Tryon don't begin to tell the story of how deeply rooted
their problems are. Many were in foster care before coming here, and almost every kid
has endured some form of abuse. An employee talks about a boy who was sexually
abused starting at age 6 by multiple female members of his family. And then there was
the kid who was tossed into a Dumpster at age 2. Almost every resident here has a
diagnosis, if not four or five: ADD, ADHD, bipolar illness, depression, PTSD,
schizophrenia. "Who do we incarcerate in the state of New York? Kids with serious
mental-health disorders," Carrion says. "I feel like I'm running a psychiatric hospital."
Gonnerman, supra note 130.
149. Jeff Storey, New York City Closes Juvenile Detention Facility, 245 N.Y. LU. 1 (2011). The juvenile
population confined in ACS facilities declined by thirty-one percent since 2006. Id.
1 50. Buettner, sapra note 141.
151. Id.
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4. Vincent Schiraldi
One of the newest arrivals to New York's reform movement is the New York City
Commissioner of Probation, Vincent Schiraldi, who took over the leadership of the
department in early 2010. In Washington, D.C. he directed the Department of
Youth Rehabilitation Services, where his reforms, according to the Washington Post,
were "dramatic." The Post editorial page commended him for creating "unique
education and rehabilitation programs" and "turning lives around through positive
youth development"; his reforms reduced the recidivism rate and turned the city
away from "warehousing juveniles in unspeakable conditions."'52
In New York, Schiraldi has argued for increasing spending on rehabilitative
efforts and expanding community-based alternatives to confinement. He has praised
Commissioner Carridn's efforts to close the worst juvenile facilities and deplored the
waste of resources in the system.' 53 He promises to operate the department using
"evidence-based best practices" and "risk assessment tools" to promote better
outcomes.' 54 He brings years of expertise and a sense of mission to the Probation
Department and to the state reform movement generally.
5. Jonathan Lippman
On Law Day 2010, the ChiefJudge of the State of New York, Jonathan Lippman,
chose to address the need for improving the state's juvenile justice system because
"New York is failing to live up to its proud history of leadership in juvenile justice
reform."'5 5 He cited the "widespread violence and abuse" in some facilities, the high
recidivism rates of those in custody, the great expense incurred by the state, the lack
of mental health professionals assigned to juvenile facilities, and the incarceration of
many petty offenders who do not belong in state juvenile prisons and are turned into
serial offenders by the system. Stating that "New York needs to fundamentally
re-think how its justice system responds to troubled young people," the chief judge
argued for greater alternatives to incarceration and increased funding for local
probation departments charged with supervising juveniles and aiding family court
judges in carrying out their sentencing responsibilities.5 6
152. Editorial, A D.C. Reformer Departs; Vincent Sch iraldi Changed How Troubled Youth are Treated, WASH.
POsT, Dec. 4, 2009, at A26.
153. Vincent Schiraldi &John Mattingly, Transforming Juvenile Justice, 244 N.Y. L.J. 6 (2010).
154. N.Y.C. DEP'T OF PROB., STRATEGIC PLAN 2011: THE NYC MODEL OF PROBATION (2011).
155. Jonathan Lippman, Law in the 21st Century: Enduring Traditions, Emerging Challenges; Rej rms Proposed
forJuoeni1e Justice, 83 N.Y. L.J. 11 (2010).
156. Id. Family court judges deciding delinquency cases would welcome additional disposition options,
according to the administrative judge for the NYC family Court, Edwina Richardson-Mendelson.
Bosman, supra note 80. One family court judge sent a violent teen to juvenile prison but ordered him not
to be confined in the four centers criticized by the DOJ, though her authority to do so is doubtful. Jeff
Storey, In Sentencirngs, Judge Says Youths Should Not Go to Trouhled Facilities, 36 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2010). Judge
Lippman followed up his Law Day remarks with a proposal to establish special youth courts for non-
violent sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, who are now prosecuted as adults. The youth courts
would combine rehabilitative features of the family court with the formal due process procedures of
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6. Non-profit groups
New York has a rich array of non-profit organizations seeking reform of the
juvenile justice system. The following are some of the most influential advocacy
groups:
" The respected Vera Institute of Justice played a critical, if
unheralded, role in performing the staff work for the Governor's
Task Force report.'5
7
" The Legal Aid Society defends juveniles in family court and has
brought a federal class action suit, G.B. v. Carrion, arguing that
juvenile facilities deprive inmates of needed mental health care
and use excessive force against them, in violation of their
constitutional rights. 53
" The Center for Court Innovation operates youth courts in which
young offenders who have committed low-level infractions (e.g.,
marijuana possession, vandalism, shoplifting) are tried by their
teenage peers upon referral from courts, probation officers, and
police. The project has the support of bar leaders, including the
New York State Bar Association and New York's former Chief
Judge Judith Kaye."'
The Correctional Association of New York monitors prison
conditions and has recently been involved in the effort to ensure
that offenders serve sentences in facilities close to their
neighborhoods, enabling them to maintain ties to their families. 60
The New York Center for Juvenile Justice, founded by its
executive director, former state court judge Michael Corriero,
has advocated that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds be removed
from the state's criminal justice system and included in the
juvenile system. 161
Criminal Court. John Caher, Youth Court, DNA Top Lippman'sAgenda, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 15, 2012, http://
www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp.'ld=1202542248341&slreturn=1.
157. See VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, http://www.vera.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2012); see also Diane Abbey
Law Center for Children & Families, N.Y. L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/centers/projects/diane-abbey-
lawcenter for children and families (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
158. Confessore, supra note 6.
159. Tim Stelloh, Ensuring Petty Crimes Don't Lead to Big Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2010, at A22; see Kaye,
supra note 12.
160. Danny Hakim & Thomas Kaplan, As Republicans Resist Closing Pirisons, Coo Is Said to Scale Back Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at A19 (quoting the group's executive director Robert GJangi).
16]. See Corriero, supra note 12; see aso History, N.Y. CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.nycjj.org/
history (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
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The New York Civil Liberties Union has been active in
monitoring the role of the police department in the city's school
system.A2 Many young people first enter the juvenile justice
system through encounters with police assigned to their schools.
C. Factors Favoring Reform
Background factors in society can contribute, albeit indirectly, to an environment
that favors reform. Three factors worth noting are: (1) scientific advances in
understanding both emotional maturation and physical development of the brain
during adolescence; (2) decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court since 2005 dealing with
adolescence; and (3) the lack of media focus on juvenile crime.
1. Scientific Research
Recent scientific research on human development has contributed insights into
the emotional, social, and cognitive maturation of adolescents. The American
Medical Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
filed an amicus brief in Graham v. Florida, a U.S. Supreme Court case considering
the constitutionality of life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-
homicide offenses.163 The brief summarized recent developments in brain science in
this way:
Scientists have found that adolescents as a group, even at later stages of
adolescence, are more likely than adults to engage in risky, impulsive, and
sensation-seeking behavior. This is, in part, because they overvalue short-
term benefits and rewards, are less capable of controlling their impulses, and
are more easily distracted from their goals. Adolescents are also more
emotionally volatile and susceptible to stress and peer influences. In short,
the average adolescent cannot be expected to act with the same control or
foresight as a mature adult.
Behavioral scientists have observed these differences for some time, but
only recently have studies provided an understanding of the biological
underpinnings for why adolescents act the way they do. For example, brain
imaging studies reveal that adolescents generally exhibit more neural activity
than adults or children in areas of the brain that promote risky and reward-
based behavior. These studies also demonstrate that the brain continues to
mature, both structurally and functionally, throughout adolescence in regions
of the brain responsible for controlling thoughts, actions, and emotions.' 64
162. The NYCLU website describes various programs in which the organization is engaged and reports it
has issued concerning the schools and the police. See School to Prison Pipeline: Fact Sheet, N.Y. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/schooltoprison#_ftnref2 (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
163. Brief for the Am. Med. Ass'n & Am. Acad. of Child & Adolescent Psychiatrics as Amici Curiae
Supporting neither party, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412), 2009 WL 2247127.
164. Id. at2 3.
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The brief went on to describe scientific findings derived in significant part from
new, advanced brain imaging techniques that "are a quantum leap beyond previous
mechanisms for assessing brain development."'165 These studies show the slow
maturing of the pre-frontal cortex, which controls higher cognitive functioning, and
the developmental imbalances in areas of the juvenile brain that stimulate risk-taking
behaviors and impulsiveness. Interestingly, the brief did not support the juvenile in
the case before the Court, but merely requested that the justices take the scientific
evidence into account in reaching its decision. 1" 6 A similar brief, filed by several
mental health organizations, was more direct in urging the Court to find for the
juvenile petitioner and overturn his sentence of life without parole because
"condemning an immature, vulnerable, and not-yet-fully formed adolescent to die in
prison is a constitutionally disproportionate punishment." 167
The Graham majority did overturn the sentence, with a passing nod to the
scientific community: "As petitioner's amici point out, developments in psychology
and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and
adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to
mature through late adolescence.)1 68 The evidence from science was deemed more
cumulative than conclusive. Instead of relying on the scientific evidence, the Court
noted that common observation and experience supported the notion that adolescents
act immaturely and impulsively, engage in risky behavior, respond to peer pressure,
and often fail to make careful judgments about the consequences of their acts.
2. U.S. Supreme Court Cases
Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions since 2005 have helped shape the societal
perspective on juvenile crime. In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court prohibited as
unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty for juveniles under age
eighteen. 9 In the course of its opinion, the majority stated that youth should be
treated differently than adults in determinations of punishment under the criminal
justice system. The attributes of youth-immaturity, impulsiveness, susceptibility to
peer pressure, and still-developing character formation' 7 0 -led the Court to conclude
that the most extreme penalty for a crime should not apply to juveniles.
The Court extended its ruling in 2010, in Graham v. Florida, when it held that a
sentence of life in prison without parole for non-homicide crimes committed by
165. Id. at13-14.
166. Id. at 31-32.
167. Brief for the Am. Psychol. Ass'n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham v. Florida
(2009) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778.
168. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (citing Brief for Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 163 at 16-24;
Brief for Am. Psychol. Ass'n et al., supra note 167, at 22-27).
169. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
170. Id. at 569-70.
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juveniles violated the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 7' Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, explaining, "The Eighth
Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide
crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid
States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to
reenter society."1 2 The Court, while recognizing that society could demand retribution
for crimes committed by a juvenile, was not willing to give up on the possibility of a
young person being rehabilitated.
An interesting feature of the litigation was the submission of an amicus brief on
behalf of seven prominent citizens, including a former U.S. senator, all of whom had
committed serious offenses in their youth. They urged the Court to consider their
rehabilitation and subsequent contributions to society. 7 ' Further support for the
Court's view came from a Washington Post editorial praising Graham (and suggesting
the Court go further by requiring the consideration of parole for juveniles who
commit murder). 74
In 2011, the Court had another chance to reiterate the view that a young person's
age and capacities should be taken into account when he or she stands accused of
criminal behavior. The case, J.D.B.v. North Carolina, involved a thirteen-year-old
middle school student who was taken for police questioning to a room in the school.' 7
The Court, considering whether the boy was "in custody" for purposes of receiving
Miranda warnings, held that judges and police must consider the age of the juvenile
in making the "in custody" analysis. Justice Sotomayor's majority opinion drew upon
"commonsense" propositions, e.g., that children are immature and "possess only an
incomplete ability to understand the world around them."'76 She further reasoned
that "children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults."' 77
171. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
172. Id. at 2030.
173. See generally Brief of Former Juvenile Offenders Charles S. Dutton et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2219302.
174. Editorial, Too Youngfor Life Without Parole, WASH. PosT, May 18, 2010, at A18. The editorial stated that
the majority sensibly drew a bright line: No one convicted of committing a crime other
than homicide before the age of 18 may be locked away forever without at some point
being given the chance of making a case for release. That point may not come until the
offender has spent 10, 20 or even 30 years behind bars. And there is no guarantee that
such a plea would prevail. We believe the same opportunity-without-guarantee should
exist even for those who commit homicide as juveniles, but the Supreme Court did not
venture that far Monday.
Id.
175. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
176. Id. at 2403.
177. Id. at 2404. The opinion begins with the "commonsense reality" that "children will often feel bound to
submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave." Id. at
2398-99.
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Although these opinions do not bear directly on the juvenile justice reforms
under consideration in New York, they may serve to influence the way in which
participants in public discussion think about young offenders. Harsh rhetoric from
the Court about juvenile crime might have made proposed changes in New York
seem "soft on crime"; instead, the Court's measured observations about the
rehabilitative potential of youth support reformers' efforts to work with offenders to
turn their lives around.
3. Media Focus on Reform and off Crime
The media brought public attention in New York to the grave deficiencies in the
juvenile justice system. Perhaps equally important is what the media did not shine its
spotlight on-juvenile crime-despite the fact that there is never a shortage of
possible stories about juvenile criminal activity. After all, in 2010, 45,873 young
people between the ages of sixteen and eighteen were arrested in New York, some of
whom were doubtless charged with serious crimes.1 78 But the major fact to be
highlighted about juvenile crime is its sharp decline nationwide:
In 2008, the year of the most recent national estimate from the Justice
Department, law enforcement agencies made about 2.1 million arrests of
teenagers younger than 18, and most of those cases involved 16- and 17-year-
olds. The data also showed a drastic decrease in arrest levels since the
mid-1990s: there were an estimated 2.9 million such arrests in 1996, when
the population of those under 18 was smaller than it is today.179
While crimes by youth garner less attention, crimes against children have attracted
wide media coverage. Recently, the most intense media attention focused on the case
against Casey Anthony, a mother charged with the murder of her two-year-old
daughter Caylee. The lengthy case "transfixed America for three years"8' and ended
in the summer of 2011 when a Florida jury found Ms. Anthony not guilty of murder
and convicted her only of providing false information to the police. In a case closer to
home, the murder of an eight-year-old boy in Brooklyn drew enormous attention
during July 2011.181
With the juvenile crime rate falling and the media occupied with other matters,
such as crimes that create sympathy for victimized children, there is some political
space for those seeking to humanize the juvenile justice system. Reformers must
hope this favorable media environment continues.
178. Secret, supra note 45, at 2.
179. Id.
180. Lizette Alvarez, Florida Mother Is Found Not Guilty of Murder, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2011, at Al. A
Gloogle search on July 31, 2011 for "casey anthony trial" yielded 34,900,000 results.
181. Anahad O'Connor & Juliet Linderman, Thousands Mourn Boy Killed in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
2011.
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D. Obstacles to Reform
With the stars seemingly well aligned for reform, what could go wrong? Plenty,
of course. The following section will detail some reasons why it would be unwise to
rest easy that reforms will take place, notwithstanding how needed and beneficial
the changes might be.
1. Budgets
First, consider the issue of money. Any change, even one that may pay big
dividends, requires some investment in a new set of arrangements. Unfortunately,
today's sizeable budget deficits make new investments much less likely. Furthermore,
state budgets reflect not only monetary allotments, but also power allocations. The
constant battles in New York-between upstate and downstate interests, city and
state control, conservatives and liberals, and the state senate and the state assembly-
ensure that no road to reform in the state will ever be smooth.
Some of the conflicts over money have been adverted to previously. There are
substantial savings to be had in the shift from incarceration, which is extremely
expensive, to other alternatives. But the savings achieved thus far by closing detention
centers are not largely directed to funding alternatives; they instead go into the state's
general fund. 182 The state has a multi-billion dollar deficit to deal with and new
programs, no matter how promising, are thrown into the fight over how state moneys
are to be allocated. Meanwhile, some beneficial funding may be offset by cuts to
other worthwhile programs. New York City Commissioners Schiraldi (Department
of Probation) and John Mattingly (ACS) remind us that,
Governor Paterson's administration proposed spending $18 million to address
the Justice Department's criticisms, such as the lack of mental health services
in state facilities. But at the same time, it proposed cutting $16 million from
alternative local programs that were keeping low-risk youth in their home
communities. This robs an effective Peter to pay for a destructive Paul.' 83
And even when funds are made available, there is competition between
communities; smaller municipalities may worry that money will be siphoned off by
New York City, to the disadvantage of their own locales.
11
4
Certain reforms, like the proposals to lift the age of criminal responsibility to the
age of eighteen, require a particular expansion of personnel. If sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds are to be included in the juvenile delinquency regime, their cases must be
tried in family court, an already very busy place, and prosecuted by the city's Law
Department. New judges must be added, as well as new prosecutors and perhaps new
182. New York City Commissioners Schiraldi (Probation) and Mattingly (ACS) have urged the state to
continue facilities closings and to "reallocate savings to local government," which they acknowledged
"will take no small amount of political courage." See Schiraldi &Mattingly, supra note 153, at 6.
183. Id.
1 84. See Buettner, suprTa note 141.
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courtrooms. The legislature is not always receptive to the judiciary's call for more
funds, as demonstrated by the lengthy battle over salary raises for state judges.''
Money is needed by probation departments seeking to expand non-prison
alternatives for juveniles. The state's Chief Judge has argued that the judiciary should
control probation funding and services.' 86 Unfortunately, all reform ideas that raise
questions of control raise conflicts over authority, the ever-present political "turf
wars." Currently, the New York City Probation Department wants to change the
allocation of authority between the city and the state in the area of juvenile
dispositions. Commissioner Schiraldi, writing with Commissioner Mattingly, urged
the State to empower local governments "to take care of their own young people in
their own communities, when appropriate."' 87 In the meantime, over the last two
decades the state's share in funding local probation departments has fallen from
forty-seven percent to eighteen percent. 88
Major budget problems plaguing all levels of government can undermine efforts
to provide the tools and personnel needed for youth rehabilitation. Refusals to fund
new ideas and innovations can stifle experimentation. Cuts to programs that promote
literacy, education, adult mentoring, help for runaway youth, and a host of other
projects will hinder reform efforts to help young people avoid involvement with the
juvenile justice system, as well as damage efforts to put those in the system on paths
away from crime.
2. Political Leadership
With political leaders-even those professing a desire for reform-there is always
the possibility that they will be distracted, lose interest, or otherwise cool to the
reform project. The juvenile justice system is filled disproportionately with minority
youth,"'89 who lack political power and have never been a popular segment of society.
Governors have multiple agendas, need to deal with shifting alliances on a number
of public issues, and may be swayed to deal away juvenile justice reform opportunities
in order to pursue other goals deemed more worthy, more politically advantageous,
or more attainable. For example, Governor Cuomo decided to invest his political
capital in pushing a same-sex marriage bill through the legislature, requiring
Republican votes in the state senate. Who knows what he may have promised in
return. If (and this is mere speculation) he agreed to put his effort to get rid of
overstaffed, underused juvenile jails on the back burner because they are located in
Republican districts that need jobs, the juvenile reform effort would have lost out to
another worthy objective. Similarly, Republican cooperation on budget issues may be
185. William Glaberson, Caution Urged on Raises for State Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at A22.
186. Lippman, supra note 155, at 11.
187. Schiraldi &Mattingly, supra note 153.
188. GOVERNOR DAVID PATTERSON'S TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF PROBATION IN NEW YORK STATE:
PHASE II, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE 5 (2008).
189. TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 27-28 (reporting that almost "85 percent.., of the young people entering
OCFS custody in 2007 were either African American (59.4 percent) or Latino (24.8 percent)").
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needed in the future and therefore may become the subject of hard political
bargaining. It is noteworthy that within a few weeks of his taking office, Governor
Cuomo appeared to sharply curtail his prison closing plans, in the face of "stiff
resistance" from Senate Republicans, who were concerned about the loss of hundreds
of state jobs held by their constituents.190 Regardless, facilities have been closed and
the governor has won a reduction, but not the elimination, of the time required to
notify prison employees of a closure, from one year to two months.191
3. Public Opinion
Opinion leaders like the New York Times have been advocating reform in editorials
and describing the intolerable conditions in juvenile prisons in news columns, helping
to create a favorable climate for reform.' 92 The sharp drop in juvenile crime
throughout the nation has also allowed a window to open for reforms that were
impossible in the fear-ridden 1990s.19'
But public opinion can be fickle, and it can turn on unexpected events. A terrible
crime committed by a youth or a gang, for example, can stir public outrage and make
politicians leap to the microphones demanding severe "law and order" policies. It has
happened in the past, such as when fifteen-year-old murderer Willie Bosket burst on
the scene thirty years ago. 94 Even academics caught the fever when juvenile crime
was high, with one Princeton professor predicting that "super-predators"-a term
coined to describe amoral, violent teens-would be roaming the streets of America
in force by the year 2010.19"
Reform advocates must guard against public rejection of their efforts in the wake of
possible notorious juvenile crimes. They may do this by making it clear that proposed
changes to the juvenile justice system are not designed to protect the worst teen
offenders from prosecution and just punishment. The public wants teens who commit
violent crimes to be held accountable and, frankly, wants retribution, which is a
190. Danny Hakim &Thomas Kaplan, supra note 160.
191. See Stashenko, supra note 139.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 72-168. National magazines have also carried stories favorable to
reform. See, e.g., Ken Stier, Why Reforming the Juvenile Justice System is So Hard, TIME, Sept. 16, 2009;
Maia Szalavitz, Why Juvenile Detention Makes Teens Worse, TIME (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.time.
com/time/health/article/0,8599,1914837,00.html.
193. See Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessonsfor a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 483,486
(2009).
194. See supra text accompanying note 50. As a teenager, Willie Bosket was convicted of murdering two New
Yorkers on the subway. He led a life of crime and became known as the most incorrigible offender in the
New York state prison system. Fox Butterfield, Jailed 'Monster' Gets More Prison Time for Stabbing a
Guard, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 20, 1989, at B3.
195. Soler et al., supra note 193 (quoting John D. Dilulio of Princeton, and noting that similar dire, but
wrong, predictions were made by James Q Wilson of Harvard and James Allen Fox of Northeastern
University).
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legitimate and longstanding goal of the criminal law.196 Reformers need to reassure the
citizenry that they also share a feeling of revulsion at the worst youth crimes, and that
whatever changes they suggest in the system, the worst offenses will still be punished
and the public will be kept safe from the most violent offenders.1 9 Reformers often
succeed when they show flexibility. Therefore, they should let the public know that the
system can deal with both the worst and the less serious crimes committed by youth.
Indeed, even a rehabilitative approach can be "sold" as one that promotes public safety
by lowering recidivism rates and avoids transforming juveniles into career criminals.
III. CONCLUSION
New York is attempting to reform its juvenile justice system in many ways, from
closing down detention centers that have been condemned as abusive and inhumane,
to building up community-based programs to rehabilitate offenders and drive down
recidivism rates. A good deal has been accomplished thus far, largely due to a
combination of factors that have favored reform efforts. A critical role has been
played by the New York Times in informing the public of systemic abuses and in
publishing a series of stinging editorials that demand action from public officials. A
set of reform-minded commissioners and political leaders are now in place. A
reduction in levels of juvenile crime has created an opportunity for reforms to take
hold. The road to further change seems open. Nevertheless, full reform of complex
and entrenched statewide bureaucratic systems takes time. Obstacles-in the form of
limited budgets, political opposition, and shifting public opinion-may yet cause the
reform effort to lose momentum. The battles ahead will determine the shape of
juvenile justice in New York for years to come.
196. The Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida acknowledged that retribution is a legitimate reason to punish
juveniles, stating that "'the heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender."' 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (quoting
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
197. New York City officials did this when announcing the effort to provide alternatives to imprisonment,
reassuring the public that any juveniles considered a threat to public safety will continue to be
incarcerated. Julie Bosman, Seeking to Send Fewer Yoazhs to Jail, City Shifts Strategy on Delznqaency, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A31.
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